fix hw queue selection for 802.11 raw frame injection
Update mac80211 support patch: * remove obsolte monitor sdata handling (we don't use a monitor interface, so accessing that data is a bug) * initialize the skb queue mapping to match the tid, at least ath9k does not like it when the tid and queue mapping disagree
This commit is contained in:
Andreas Schultz
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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From c26411bf0d00a6ceed42e85d66812b591b7c4c83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From 14e0315c4d59ccc59c86543323a2d5a36b7b7f14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Andreas Schultz <aschultz@tpip.net>
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Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2016 15:57:11 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] support patch for smartcapwap
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@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ Allows for kernel side interception and injection of IEEE 802.11 frames.
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---
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include/net/mac80211.h | 25 ++++
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net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 6 +
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net/mac80211/iface.c | 56 ++++++++
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net/mac80211/rx.c | 81 ++++++++++--
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net/mac80211/tx.c | 312 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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5 files changed, 468 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
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net/mac80211/iface.c | 56 +++++++++
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net/mac80211/rx.c | 81 +++++++++++--
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net/mac80211/tx.c | 283 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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5 files changed, 439 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/include/net/mac80211.h b/include/net/mac80211.h
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index 760bc4d..6722da6 100644
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@ -334,10 +334,10 @@ index 82af407..29cc59b 100644
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rcu_read_unlock();
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diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c
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index bdc224d..fd48ccf 100644
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index bdc224d..af69af6 100644
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--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
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+++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
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@@ -2939,6 +2939,144 @@ netdev_tx_t ieee80211_subif_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
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@@ -2939,6 +2939,115 @@ netdev_tx_t ieee80211_subif_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
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return NETDEV_TX_OK;
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}
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@ -353,8 +353,9 @@ index bdc224d..fd48ccf 100644
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+ struct ieee80211_chanctx_conf *chanctx_conf;
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+ struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
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+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
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+ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *tmp_sdata, *sdata;
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+ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
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+ struct cfg80211_chan_def *chandef;
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+ int tid;
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+ int hdrlen;
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+
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+ /* check for not even having the fixed 802.11 header */
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@ -367,13 +368,13 @@ index bdc224d..fd48ccf 100644
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+ if (unlikely(skb->len < hdrlen))
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+ goto fail; /* skb too short for claimed header length */
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+
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+ skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
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+ skb_set_mac_header(skb, 0);
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+ /*
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+ * these are just fixed to the end of the rt area since we
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+ * don't have any better information and at this point, nobody cares
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+ */
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+ skb_reset_network_header(skb);
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+ skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
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+ skb_set_network_header(skb, hdrlen);
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+ skb_set_transport_header(skb, hdrlen);
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+
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+ /*
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+ * Initialize skb->protocol if the injected frame is a data frame
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@ -393,13 +394,12 @@ index bdc224d..fd48ccf 100644
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+
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+ skb->priority = *p & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TAG1D_MASK;
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+ }
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+ skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, ieee802_1d_to_ac[skb->priority]);
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+
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+ memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
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+
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+ info->flags = IEEE80211_TX_CTL_REQ_TX_STATUS |
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+ IEEE80211_TX_CTL_INJECTED;
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+
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+
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+ /*
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+ * we might have set these flags later.....
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+ * info->flags &= ~IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT;
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@ -411,46 +411,17 @@ index bdc224d..fd48ccf 100644
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+ sdata = IEEE80211_DEV_TO_SUB_IF(dev);
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+
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+ chanctx_conf = rcu_dereference(sdata->vif.chanctx_conf);
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+ if (!chanctx_conf) {
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+ tmp_sdata = rcu_dereference(local->monitor_sdata);
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+ if (tmp_sdata)
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+ chanctx_conf =
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+ rcu_dereference(tmp_sdata->vif.chanctx_conf);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (chanctx_conf)
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+ chandef = &chanctx_conf->def;
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+ else if (!local->use_chanctx)
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+ chandef = &local->_oper_chandef;
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+ else
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+ if (!chanctx_conf)
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+ goto fail_rcu;
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+
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+ /*
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+ * Frame injection is not allowed if beaconing is not allowed
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+ * or if we need radar detection. Beaconing is usually not allowed when
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+ * the mode or operation (Adhoc, AP, Mesh) does not support DFS.
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+ * Passive scan is also used in world regulatory domains where
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+ * your country is not known and as such it should be treated as
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+ * NO TX unless the channel is explicitly allowed in which case
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+ * your current regulatory domain would not have the passive scan
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+ * flag.
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+ *
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+ * Since AP mode uses monitor interfaces to inject/TX management
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+ * frames we can make AP mode the exception to this rule once it
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+ * supports radar detection as its implementation can deal with
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+ * radar detection by itself. We can do that later by adding a
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+ * monitor flag interfaces used for AP support.
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+ */
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+ if (!cfg80211_reg_can_beacon(local->hw.wiphy, chandef,
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+ sdata->vif.type))
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+ goto fail_rcu;
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+ info->band = chanctx_conf->def.chan->band;
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+
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+ ieee80211_tx_stats(dev, skb->len);
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+
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+ info->band = chandef->chan->band;
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+ ieee80211_xmit(sdata, NULL, skb);
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+ rcu_read_unlock();
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+
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+ return;
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+
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+fail_rcu:
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+ rcu_read_unlock();
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+fail:
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@ -482,7 +453,7 @@ index bdc224d..fd48ccf 100644
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struct sk_buff *
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ieee80211_build_data_template(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
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struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info_flags)
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@@ -3914,3 +4052,177 @@ void __ieee80211_tx_skb_tid_band(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
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@@ -3914,3 +4023,177 @@ void __ieee80211_tx_skb_tid_band(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
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ieee80211_xmit(sdata, NULL, skb);
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local_bh_enable();
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}
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